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Abstract 
Probabilistic models of expected information gain require integrating prior knowledge about 
causal hypotheses with knowledge about possible actions that might generate data relevant 
to those hypotheses. Here we looked at whether preschoolers (mean: 54 months) recognize 
“action possibilities” (affordances) in the environment that allow them to isolate variables 
when there is information to be gained.  By manipulating the physical properties of the 
stimuli, we were able to affect the degree to which candidate variables could be isolated; by 
manipulating the base rate of candidate causes, we were able to affect the potential for 
information gain.  Children’s exploratory play was sensitive to both manipulations: given 
unambiguous evidence children played indiscriminately and rarely tried to isolate candidate 
causes; given ambiguous evidence, children both selected (Experiment 1) and designed 
(Experiment 2) informative interventions.   
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 Cooks Illustrated recently published an article (Cracking the code to chewy brownies; 
March, 2010) on how to make homemade brownies with the texture and “shiny, crisp, crackly 
top” of boxed mixes. A food editor suggested that the testers consider the proportion of solid 
(saturated) to liquid (unsaturated) fat.  The testers proceeded to hold the total fat constant 
while varying the ratio the fats until tasters judged that they had achieved the perfect brownie.   
 The article illustrates not only what you need to know to bake a brownie, but also 
much of what you need to know to conduct an informative experiment.  You need to know 
when there is information to be gained (e.g., that there is some uncertainty about what makes 
brownies taste good); you need a theory about which variables are relevant (that there are 
different kinds of fats with different properties); you need to know how to distinguish the 
causal role of these variables (by changing one factor at a time), and you need to know what 
features of the environment can be manipulated to let you test these factors (that fats can be 
mixed in different combinations). 
Experimentation thus calls on a diverse range of skills.  Arguably however, 
experimentation is an arcane practice, of interest primarily to scientists and America’s Test 
Kitchen.  There are at least two reasons however, to think that some principles of experimental 
design are central to everyday cognition.   
First, daily life frequently presents us with competing causal hypotheses.  If we cannot 
unlock a door, it makes sense to rotate the key or try a new key but not to try a new key in a 
new position. Even lay adults seem to recognize the value of interventions that isolate variables. 
Second, contemporary theories of cognitive development have been profoundly shaped 
by an analogy to science.  The theory theory, the idea that everyday knowledge has the 
structural, functional, and dynamic properties of scientific theories, has been among the most 
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influential accounts of cognitive development in recent decades (Carey, 1985, 2000; Gelman, 
2003; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik & Schulz, 2007; Keil, 1989; Wellman, 1990).  
Research in this tradition attests to the structural, dynamic, and functional similarities between 
children’s knowledge and scientific theories, pointing out that both kinds of knowledge are 
abstract, coherent, and causal; both involve an interaction between evidence and prior beliefs, 
and both support prediction, explanation, and intervention (see Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997 for 
exposition and review).  
The “child as scientist” account would seem to predict that an additional functional 
feature of theories -- the ability to support informative exploration -- should also emerge in 
early childhood. However, evidence for this seemingly fundamental point of comparison 
between science and cognitive development, the dynamic by which new knowledge is acquired, 
has been strikingly mixed.  Indeed, education research looking at the relationship between self-
guided exploration and science learning has found evidence against the claim that children 
“learn by doing.”  Studies suggest that students have a poor metacognitive understanding of 
principles of experimental design, difficulty designing controlled interventions, and difficulty 
anticipating the type of evidence that would support or undermine causal hypotheses (Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1958; Klahr & Nigam, 2004; Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Laughlin, 1988; 
Koslowski, 1996; Masnick & Klahr, 2003). 
 Research in science education however, typically investigates students’ understanding of 
real world phenomena (e.g., density, balance relations, etc.).  In such contexts, children’s 
reliance on domain-specific prior beliefs may mask their formal reasoning abilities (Koslowski, 
1996; Kuhn, 1989; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2005; Schulz, Bonawitz, & Griffiths, 2007; Schulz & 
Gopnik, 2004; Sobel & Munro, 2009). Additionally, students are often tested on relatively 
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complex, multivariate problems (e.g., Kuhn, 1989; Masnick & Klahr, 2003). Such problems are 
appropriate for investigating factors that could affect classroom performance but may 
underestimate children’s causal reasoning in simpler contexts.   
 Developmental studies provide stronger grounds for optimism about children’s ability to 
design informative interventions. Work in fields ranging from perception to motor learning to 
industrial design (e.g., Adolph, Eppler, & Gibson, 1993; Berger, Adolph, & Lobo, 2005; 
Brown, 1990 Lockman, 2000; Norman, 1988, 1999) suggests that learners discover action 
possibilities or affordances (Gibson, 1977) in the environment through exploration. Research 
suggests for instance that toddlers inspect the length and ends of rakes when they need a tool to 
reach a distant object (Brown, 1990), and the rigidity of handrails when they need to cross 
narrow bridges (Berger et al., 2005). Similarly, when access to a toy or food is obstructed, 
toddlers, non-human primates, and even corvids can perform novel interventions to gain 
information and achieve their goals (Brauer, Kaminski, Riedel, Call & Tomasello, 2006; Emery 
& Clayton, 2004; Hood, Carey, & Prasada, 2000; Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007; Stulp, Emery, 
Verhulst, & Clayton, 2009). However, children can learn object functions without designing 
experiments; the ability to intervene on physical features of the environment to gain information 
does not necessarily entail the ability to intervene when information is unknown because of 
formal properties of the evidence (e.g., because causal variables are confounded). 
 The strongest evidence that children may understand some formal principles underlying 
experimental design comes from research looking at children’s causal reasoning. Studies 
suggest, for instance, that preschoolers understand patterns of co-variation well enough to 
distinguish genuine causes from spurious associations: if two variables together generate an 
effect but only one variable generates the effect independently, children conclude that the other 
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variable is not a cause  (Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz & Glymour, 2001; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2005; 
2007; Schulz & Gopnik, 2004).  Children’s causal judgments are also sensitive to the base rate 
of candidate causes.  When the status of a causal variable is ambiguous, preschoolers are more 
likely to believe it is causal when causes are common than when they are rare (Sobel, 
Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004).  Moreover, preschoolers can draw accurate inferences not only 
from observed evidence but also from evidence they generate (by chance) in exploratory play 
(Schulz, Gopnik, & Glymour, 2007).  Finally, two recent studies (Gweon & Schulz, 2008; 
Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007) suggest that children’s exploratory play is affected by the ambiguity 
of the evidence they observe; given confounded or un-confounded evidence about which of two 
variables controls which of two effects, preschoolers’ selectively explore confounded evidence. 
Critically however, selective exploration of confounded evidence is advantageous even if 
children explore randomly (with no understanding of how to isolate variables): the more 
different actions children perform, the better their odds of generating informative data. 
 Thus despite evidence for the sophistication of children’s causal reasoning, previous 
work falls short of suggesting that children design interventions that respect principles of 
experimental design: children might both learn from informative evidence (Gopnik et al., 2001, 
Schulz & Gopnik, 2004; Schulz, et al., 2007; Sobel, et al., 2004), and selectively explore 
uninformative evidence (Gweon & Schulz, 2009; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007), without any 
understanding of what it is about evidence that makes it informative or uninformative.  
Specifically, preschoolers might not understand that isolating variables generates informative 
evidence, or that confounding generates uninformative evidence.  Do children understand the 
kind of interventions that support information gain?  Do they selectively perform interventions 
that isolate competing candidate causes? 
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 Before investigating empirically whether there are contexts in which children can 
engage in effective experimentation, we might want to know, normatively, when and how they 
should do so.  That is, how should one choose an action, if one’s goal is to learn how a causal 
system works? In answering this question, we are motivated by work on probabilistic models in 
adult cognitive science, looking at exploration/exploitation trade-offs and decision-making 
under uncertainty (e.g., Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 
2006; Kaelbling, 1993; Kang et al., 2009; McClure, Daw, & Read Montague, 2003; Sutton & 
Barto, 1998).  Although many of these studies have focused not on richly structured causal 
domains, but on arbitrary reinforcement learning problems (e.g., multi-armed bandit tasks, 
stacked card decks, maze-running tasks with hidden rewards, etc), computational models of the 
expected information gain associated with different actions establish an important starting point 
for the current work.  
It is optimal (in a decision-theoretic sense) to maximize the expected information gain of 
an action (see Oaksford and Chater, 1994); in particular, it is optimal to choose the action that 
will most decrease the uncertainty over the causal structure that relates the variables of interest.  
Formally, the information gain from observing data D after taking action A can be represented 
by: 
1) Ig(D,A) = I(P(H|D,A)) – I(P(H)), 
where I(p) represents the Shannon-Wiener information (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Wiener, 
1948) of distribution p: I(p) = - Σi pi log2(pi). The expected information gain from taking action 
A is then: 
2)  EIg(A) = ΣiP(Di|A)Ig(Di,A), 
where the probability of an observation given an action is: 
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3)  P(Di|A)= ΣkP(Di|A,Hk)P(Hk). 
In choosing the action which maximizes the expected information gain there are thus 
two main contributing factors: P(H) and P(D|A,H). These describe where in the system there is 
information to be learned and how that information can be gathered. The prior distribution P(H) 
will capture effects of prior knowledge (such as baserates) and earlier evidence (such as 
confounded observations). As noted, previous research (Gweon & Schulz, 2008; Schulz & 
Bonawitz, 2007) has indeed shown that children explore a causal system more when there is 
information to be gained.  
 The second term influencing optimal information gain describes how actions give rise to 
observed data, given the causal structure hypothesis. Typically this is assumed to be a simple, 
direct function: for each object there is an action (e.g. putting it on the detector) that will lead to 
data that reflects the causal status of that object (e.g. the detector activates if the object is a 
‘blicket’). Under this assumption, there is no interesting contribution from the P(D|A,H) term; 
actions will be taken on the objects about which there is the greatest uncertainty.  
However, real world scientific situations, and many situations facing children, have a 
much more complex relationship between available actions and the causal variables of interest. 
Designing an experiment is often harder than merely choosing what one should try to learn.  For 
instance, if there is not a one-to-one relationship between actions and objects then P(D|A,H) can 
reflect an inability to isolate some causal variables. In our first experiment, we set up a situation 
in which there are four objects of uncertain causal status, but only three actions: two which will 
lead to evidence about two objects individually, and one which leads to (confounded) evidence 
about a pair of objects. Thus while the contribution of P(H) to EIg supports exploration of all 
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four objects equally, the incorporation of P(D|A,H) leads to preferential exploration with the 
separable objects.  We test this prediction in Experiment 1.    
 Perhaps more than any other claim about causal reasoning in young children, the idea 
that children might be capable of selectively performing informative interventions puts the 
analogy between children and scientists to the test. This is the claim we investigate here.  We 
hypothesize that when the probability of information gain is high, preschoolers will exploit 
available affordances to isolate and test causal variables consistent with their folk theories about 
plausible mechanisms.  
By suggesting that preschoolers selectively perform informative interventions, we mean 
both something more than the idea that children learn through exploratory play and something 
less than the idea that children explicitly understand and apply principles of experimental 
design.  We believe children’s spontaneous experimentation can be distinguished from trial and 
error learning or “mere” exploratory behavior by its selectivity.  That is, we predict that children 
will be more likely to perform actions that isolate relevant variables when the probability of 
information gain is high than when it is low, and that children will be specifically likely to 
perform actions that isolate relevant variables (rather than simply acting more in general). 
Children’s spontaneous experimentation can be distinguished from a metacognitive 
understanding of experimental design both by its noisy implementation and its fragility.  We do 
not predict that children will perform only informative experiments, that they will perform 
informative experiments in preference to other playful actions, or that they will perform 
informative experiments methodically (without redundancy or interruption).  Additionally, we 
believe that children’s ability to generate informative actions can be easily compromised by 
other task demands (e.g., by increasing the number of variables involved or changing the status 
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of those variables with respect to the children’s prior beliefs).  We presume that bringing the 
ability to generate informative interventions to bear on tasks of arbitrary complexity requires 
formal science education. 
Here we look at children’s ability to design interventions in a simple toy world.  We 
give children base rate information about candidate causes, showing them either that 4 of 4 
beads (the All Beads condition) or 2 of 4 beads (the Some Beads conditions) activate a toy when 
the beads are placed, one at a time, on top of the toy.  We then show both groups of children 
two pairs of beads.  All children learn that one of the bead pairs can be pulled apart into two 
individual beads, while the other pair is glued together.  Finally, children learn that both bead 
pairs activate the toy. (See Figure 1.)  
Although in principle only one bead in each pair might be causally effective, the 
Figure 1. Procedure used in Experiment 1. 
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evidence about the bead pair should be relatively unambiguous for children in the All Beads 
condition; the base rate information strongly supports the hypothesis that both beads in both 
pairs activate the toy. By contrast, the evidence about the bead pairs is genuinely ambiguous for 
children in the Some Beads conditions; the evidence fails to distinguish which bead works (or 
whether both do).  Put another way, when All Beads are presumed to be effective, there is 
relatively little information to be gained about the new beads; when only Some Beads are 
effective (but you do not know which ones are), there is the potential for information gain. 
 Since evidence suggests that preschoolers expect physical causal relations to respect 
contact causality (e.g., Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007), we chose that as the folk theory relevant to 
experiments the children might perform.  If children only bring their knowledge of physical 
causality to bear, they could always place both bead pairs on the toy.  However, if children 
understand that causal variables need to be tested independently, they need to figure out how 
this can be instantiated with the materials at hand.  In particular, they need to look for beads that 
allow isolated contact with the toy.   Only the separable bead pair has the necessary affordances. 
Moreover, if children specifically separate the beads and place them individually on the toy 
because of the potential for information gain (rather than because they simply enjoy separating 
the beads) then children should be more likely to perform this intervention in the Some Beads 
condition than the All Beads condition.  Finally, if faced with ambiguous evidence children 
engage in spontaneous experimentation rather than simply extensive free play, the conditions 
should differ with respect to children’s tendency to perform the informative experiment, but not 
otherwise.  
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty preschoolers (52% girls) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: an All 
Beads (mean: 53 months; range: 46-63 months), a Some Beads B (mean: 55 months; range: 48-
61 months) or a Some Beads AB (mean: 54 months; range: 46-64 months) condition. The 
condition names indicate the beads that activated the machine during the Base Rate Training. In 
the All Beads condition, all beads were effective; in both Some Beads conditions, half the beads 
were effective and half were not.  During Free Play, children in the Some Beads condition could 
discover either that only the first bead, only the second bead, or, both beads activated the 
machine. We gave children evidence that only the second bead worked (Some Beads B 
condition) and that both beads worked (Some Beads AB condition).1 Seven participants were 
excluded and replaced, six due to experimental error (1 in the All Beads, 1 in the Some Beads B 
and 4 in the Some Beads AB condition) and one (in the Some Beads B condition) due to a 
language barrier. 
Materials 
 Eight 15 cm. x 10cm. x 10cm. Fisher-Price connectable beads were used.  The beads 
were shaped and painted so that no two were perceptually identical.  Two of the beads were 
glued together and could not be snapped apart.  A 23 cm. x 23 cm. x 6cm. custom-built machine 
was also used. The machine had four green LED lights at the top corners. A hidden remote 
switch, controlled by the experimenter, turned the machine on and off.  The top of the machine 
                                                           
1 Of course, once a child discovers that the first bead she tries does not work (i.e., in the Some Beads B condition) 
she can infer that the second bead does, but we assumed that children would be eager to confirm this.  We did not 
give children evidence that only the first bead worked because (insofar as only the evidence of the first bead could 
affect children’s subsequent actions) it was redundant with the AB condition.  
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had a pressure-sensitive platform (21 cm. diameter). When the switch was in the on position, the 
machine played music and lit up when the beads were placed on the platform; the machine 
turned off as soon as the beads were removed.  When the switch was in the off position, the 
machine was always inert. 
Procedure 
Warm up. The warm-up period was designed to familiarize the child with the stimuli and 
to reduce any novelty associated with merely snapping the beads together and apart.   The 
experimenter showed the child four beads and pointed out that each bead looked different.  The 
experimenter showed the child that the beads could be snapped together and pulled apart, and 
encouraged the child to try.  Children were allowed to play with the beads as long as they liked; 
there was no difference in children’s mean play time between conditions (All Beads, 32.81 s; 
Some Beads B, 31.91 s; Some Beads AB, 28.83 s; F(2, 25) = 1.38, p = ns) or the mean number of 
times children snapped apart the beads during the warm-up period (All Beads, 6.45; Some Beads 
B, 5.73, Some Beads AB, 5.00; F(2, 25) = .24, p = ns). 2  
Base rate training. The experimenter introduced her “special machine” and told the 
child, “Some things make the machine go, and some things don’t make the machine go” 
(allowing the interpretation in the All Beads condition that things other than beads might fail to 
activate the machine).  The experimenter placed each bead on the machine one at a time. In the 
All Beads condition, all the beads activated the machine.  In both Some Beads conditions, two of 
the four beads activated the machine and the other two beads did not (either the first and third or 
first and fourth bead activated, counterbalanced across children). 
                                                           
2 Some parents continued to read the consent form during the warm-up period. We only videotaped the warm-up 
period if the consent form was submitted so this data was available for 17 of 20 children the All Beads condition, 
16 of 20 children in the Some Beads B condition and 12 of 20 children in the Some Beads AB condition. 
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Demonstration of Bead Pairs and Free Play. The experimenter removed the training 
beads and introduced the paired beads.  One pair was placed to the right of the machine and the 
other to the left (counterbalanced). Starting with the pair on the child’s right, the experimenter 
showed the child that one pair was stuck together while the other pair could be pulled apart. The 
child was allowed to try each pair to verify its status (stuck or separable). The experimenter then 
placed the pair on the child’s right on the machine, and the machine activated.  The 
experimenter took that pair off and placed the other pair on the machine; again the machine 
activated. Each time the machine activated, the experimenter said, “Wow, look at that. I wonder 
what makes the machine go?”  The experimenter then said, “Go ahead and play” and walked out 
of the child’s line of sight; the child was left to play with the two bead pairs and the machine for 
60 seconds.   
Results and Discussion 
The critical question was whether children in the Some Beads conditions would select 
the informative action that disambiguates the evidence: separating the separable pair and 
placing each bead individually on the machine. Of course, children might test each bead 
individually simply for fun.  Thus the dependent measure of interest was whether children 
performed the specific informative “experiment” (separating the bead pair and testing each 
member individually on the machine) more often in the Some Beads conditions than the All 
Beads condition. Our criteria for the informative experiment were conservative: children had to 
test each of the two beads separately (i.e., children who placed only one of the beads on the toy 
were not counted as succeeding). 
We first looked at how many children in each condition performed the informative 
experiment.  Results were coded by the first author and a coder blind to both the hypotheses and 
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conditions; intercoder agreement was 95% (Κ = .90). Data from the blind coder was used for all 
analyses.  Reported values are two-tailed tests throughout.   
Only one child (5%) in the All Beads condition performed the informative experiment.  
Indeed, the majority of children in the All Beads condition (65%) never even pulled the 
separable bead pair apart.  By contrast, 9 children (45%) in the Some Beads B and 10 children 
(50%) in the Some Beads AB condition performed the informative experiment.  See Figure 2a.  
Relative to the All Beads condition, children were more likely to perform the informative 
experiment in both the Some Beads B (χ2 (1, N = 40) = 8.53,  p < .005) and Some Beads AB (χ2 
(1, N = 40) = 10.16,  p < .005) condition; performance did not differ between the Some Beads 
conditions (χ2 (1, N = 40) = 0.10,  p = ns). 
 
 
Children might be more likely to explore ambiguous than unambiguous evidence 
(consistent with Gweon & Schulz, 2008; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007) and yet explore broadly, 
without any insight into potentially informative actions.  If so, children might happen upon the 
informative experiment by chance without specifically choosing the intervention because it is 
informative. To see whether children differed only with respect to their tendency to perform the 
Figure 2. Number of children in each condition who performed the informative 
intervention in (a.) Experiment 1 and (b.) Experiment 2 
 (a.)                                                              (b.)  
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informative experiment or whether children simply played more variably overall in the Some 
Beads than the All Beads conditions, we coded children’s play in four second intervals and 
categorized each interval into one of seven mutually exclusive categories: playing with the 
separable beads (snapped apart) on the machine, playing with the separable bead pair (snapped 
together) on the machine, playing with the stuck bead pair on the machine, playing with three or 
four beads on the machine, playing with the machine alone, playing with the beads alone, or 
other (e.g., disengaged). Note that playing with the separable beads snapped on the machine is a 
component of the informative experiment; however because our criteria were conservative 
(children had to test each bead in the separable pair individually) the informative experiment 
does not reduce to any of these categories. All free play actions were coded by two coders, one 
blind to conditions and the other blind to both the hypotheses and conditions; intercoder 
agreement was 93% (Κ = .85). Data from the hypothesis blind coder was used for all analyses. 
If children simply explore more broadly given ambiguous evidence, we should expect 
children in the Some Beads conditions to perform actions in more different categories than 
children in the All Beads condition.  Although children’s play was variable within conditions 
(i.e., with some children performing actions in few categories and others in many), play across 
conditions did not differ: children performed actions across a mean of 3.83 different categories 
in the All Beads condition, 4.06 different categories in the Some Beads B condition; and a mean 
of 3.95 different categories in the Some Beads AB condition (F(2, 60) = 1.08, p = ns).  We also 
looked at whether the Some Beads and All Beads conditions differed in how many children 
performed any actions other than the target experiment. The only comparison to reach 
significance was the action that was critical to the target experiment: more children played with 
the separable beads snapped apart on the toy in the Some Beads conditions than in the All Beads 
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conditions (63% vs. 18%; χ2 (1, N = 40) = 9.37,  p < .005). None of the other comparisons 
reached significance (Fisher’s Exact: p = ns throughout).3  
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that preschool children are sensitive not 
only to uncertainty, but to the impact of possible actions on information gain (Equations 1-3): 
they spontaneously isolate relevant variables when uncertainty is high (but not when it is low) 
and specifically perform actions with higher expected information gain. That is, preschoolers 
not only distinguish relatively ambiguous and unambiguous evidence, they distinguish (and 
select) potentially informative rather than uninformative actions.  
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that preschoolers selectively perform actions that 
(approximately) maximize expected information gain, integrating information about uncertainty 
with formal principles underlying experimental design and a sensitivity to relevant affordances. 
However, in Experiment 1 the target intervention consisted of actions that were already familiar 
to the children.  (They had seen the experimenter place the beads individually on the toy and 
they had had practice snapping the beads apart.)  If children could invent novel interventions, 
rather than merely choose from familiar ones, this would provide stronger evidence of 
children’s ability to act selectively for the purpose of information gain. 
In the earlier formal analysis it was assumed that there was a small set of possible 
actions and that the relationship between actions and outcomes (the term P(D|A,H)) was known. 
In real scientific settings there are a very large number of possible experiments, and the 
relationship between those experiments, the hypotheses, and the resulting data is not completely 
                                                           
3 Note that because we predicted that the free play would not differ except with respect to the target experiment, 
it was more conservative to test each action as if it were the unique planned comparison than to correct for multiple 
comparisons.  Thus in both Experiments 1 and 2 we use the same criteria for the category intervals as for the target 
experiment and retain an uncorrected α of .05. 
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known. Knowledge of likely affordances can ameliorate these difficulties by providing prior 
knowledge about which of many actions is likely to result in evidence about given causal 
variables. 
The behavior of some participants provided an unexpected clue that children might be 
capable of just such innovation.  In Experiment 1, the experimenter always placed the bead 
pairs horizontally on the toy so that both beads made contact with the platform.  (See Figure 1.) 
However, in pilot work, some children performed an action with the stuck pair that they had 
never observed: they oriented the pair vertically so that only one end of the bead pair touched 
the toy at a time. The behavior of these children is consistent with the possibility that they were 
attempting to isolate the causal variables by varying the beads’ contact with the toy.  In order to 
look systematically at whether children could invent novel means of disambiguating evidence, 
we followed up our chance observation. In Experiment 2, we replicated the procedure of 
Experiment 1 using only the stuck bead pair.  
Method 
Participants 
Forty preschoolers (45% girls) were randomly assigned to an All Beads (mean: 54 
months, range: 48-63 months) or a Some Beads (mean: 53 months, range: 43-61 months) 
condition. Because the two Some Beads conditions in Experiment 1 did not differ, we 
counterbalanced the evidence children received during the Free Play period, such that for half 
the children, the first bead they tried failed to activate the machine (as in the Some Beads B 
condition of Experiment 1) and for half, both beads activated the machine (as in the Some Beads 
AB condition of Experiment 1). Five children (3 in the All Beads condition and 2 in the Some 
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Beads condition) were replaced: two due to experimental error, one due to parental interference, 
and two who did not wish to complete the task. 
Materials 
The same materials used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2 except that the 
separable pair of beads was not used. 
Procedure  
The procedure was identical to the procedure in Experiment 1 except that in the 
Demonstration phase, only the stuck pair of beads was introduced. After the children 
manipulated the bead pair to determine that it really was stuck together, the experimenter placed 
the pair on the machine (oriented horizontally, so that both beads made contact, as in Figure 1).  
The machine activated.  The experimenter said, “Oh, wow, look at that. I wonder what makes 
the machine go?”  The experimenter removed the pair from the machine. The experimenter told 
the child to “Go ahead and play” and left the child’s line of sight; the child was allowed to play 
for 60 seconds.   
Results and Discussion 
The critical question was whether children in the Some Beads condition could invent an 
action consistent with their folk theories about contact causality that could disambiguate the 
evidence: orienting the beads vertically in order to “isolate” the relevant variables (see Figure 
3).  Of course, children might try each end of the bead pair for reasons other than an interest in 
disambiguating the evidence (i.e., simply for fun).  Thus the dependent measure of interest was 
whether children performed the specific informative experiment more often in the Some Beads 
condition than in the All Beads condition.  Again, our criteria for the informative experiment 
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were conservative: children had to try each end of the bead pair separately.  (Children who 
touched only a single end were not counted as succeeding.)  
Results were coded by the first author and a coder blind to both the hypotheses and 
conditions; intercoder agreement was 96%4.  Data from the hypothesis blind coder was used 
throughout. Only 1 child (5%) in the All Beads condition performed the informative experiment.  
By contrast, 9 children (45%) in the Some Beads condition performed the informative 
experiment (3 children who saw only the second bead activate during free play; 6 children who 
saw both beads activate). Children were more likely to perform the informative experiment in 
the Some Beads than the All Beads condition (χ2 (1, N = 40) = 8.53, p < .005).  See Figure 2b. 
 As in Experiment 1, we wanted to look at whether children’s play differed broadly 
between the two conditions or whether their play differed only with respect to the intervention 
of interest.  We coded children’s behavior during the free play period at fifteen 4 second 
intervals into one of five mutually exclusive categories: playing with the entire stuck pair 
contacting the machine, playing with only one tip of the stuck pair contacting the machine, 
playing with the beads alone, playing with the machine alone, or other. Again, because our 
Figure 3: The informative intervention of interest in Experiment 2, varying the 
stuck pair’s contact with the machine (shown here: “AB” type evidence; the 
machine activates for both the first and second tip of the bead pair) 
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criteria were conservative (children had to test each end of the stuck pair) the informative 
experiment does not reduce to any of these categories. Results were coded by two coders, one 
blind to conditions and one blind to both the hypotheses and conditions; intercoder agreement 
was 86% (Κ = .71).  The results of the hypothesis-blind coder were used for all analyses.  
If children simply explore more broadly given ambiguous evidence, we should expect 
children in the Some Beads condition to perform actions in more different categories than 
children in the All Beads condition.  Again, although children’s play was variable within 
conditions, it did not differ across conditions: children performed actions across a mean of 3.00 
different categories in the Some Beads condition and 2.78 different categories in the All Beads 
condition; there was no significant difference between conditions, t(40) = 0.89, p = ns. We also 
looked at whether there were any differences between the Some Beads and All Beads conditions 
in how many children performed any of the other actions, not hypothesized to be of interest. 
None of the comparisons reached significance (Fisher’s Exact one-tailed: p = ns throughout). 
In Experiment 2, the relevant intervention was never shown to the child. (Indeed the 
intervention the children discovered was sufficiently non-obvious that it had not initially 
occurred to the authors of this paper.)  Nonetheless, replicating the results of Experiment 1, 
children who believed that some beads activated the toy spontaneously attempted to isolate the 
variables.  Subscribing to a principle of contact causality, they varied the beads’ contact with 
the toy so that only a single bead made contact at a time.  This behavior did not otherwise occur; 
children who believed that all the beads activated the toy almost never performed the target 
action. 
The children were of course wrong about the mechanism activating the toy: anything 
that depressed the platform activated the toy when the switch was “on.” Here however, we were 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
4 One child’s videotape could not be recoded due to technical difficulties. 
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interested, not in what children understood about the actual mechanics of the toy (evidence 
suggests that even adults have a shallow understanding of most causal mechanisms; Keil, 2003; 
Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), but in their ability to design potentially informative interventions, 
consistent with their folk theories about contact causality. The results of Experiment 2 suggest 
that children not only have this ability but also can exercise it with considerable ingenuity. 
General Discussion 
These results suggest that preschoolers distinguish, not only ambiguous and 
unambiguous evidence but also potentially informative and uninformative interventions.  In 
cases where there was information to be gained, preschoolers spontaneously selected 
(Experiment 1) and designed (Experiment 2) actions to effectively isolate the relevant variables. 
Critically, the target experiments were not otherwise part of children’s exploratory repertoire; 
children almost never performed them given unambiguous evidence.  
Maximizing the expected gain in information formalizes the “correct” experiment to 
learn about a given causal system. As our analysis showed, many factors affect the optimal 
actions: prior knowledge and recent experience enter through the term P(H), while knowledge 
about possible actions and likely affordances enters through the term P(D|A,H). Importantly, 
optimal action selection requires integrating these factors into the computation of expected 
information gain, just as science requires knowing where there is something to be learned and 
also how to learn it. Our results suggest that children are sensitive to all of these factors and 
integrate them to guide exploratory play. We believe that these results tighten the analogy to 
science that has motivated contemporary theories of cognitive development.  
This study does not establish however, whether children understood the importance of 
isolating variables initially or whether they inferred its importance in the course of the 
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experiment.  In principle, children might have recognized that they did not know the causal 
status of the beads during the bead pair demonstration, did know their status during the base rate 
training and, by comparing (in memory) the factors that differed between the two states, 
inferred that isolating the beads could support learning.  In Experiment 2, the inference is 
complicated by the fact that children could not simply re-create the state of the beads that 
obtained when they knew their causal status; children had to make a general inference about the 
importance of isolating variables and the ways of doing this.  Given that the training and bead 
pair presentation differed in many respects (e.g., different color beads were presented, the 
experimenter said different things, etc.), it may be attributing more to children to credit them 
with the ability to infer the relevant distinction without prior knowledge than to credit them with 
an initial understanding of the importance of isolating variables.  However, on either account, 
these results suggest that preschoolers attend to the kinds of evidence that distinguish states of 
knowledge from states of uncertainty, and generate novel interventions that isolate variables and 
maximize the potential for information gain.   
This is not to suggest that all aspects of experimental design can be reduced to everyday 
exploration. As suggested in the Introduction, children might understand the utility of isolating 
variables in simple contexts without any meta-cognitive understanding that isolating candidate 
causes in general disambiguates confounded data. The ability to bring common principles of 
experimental design to bear on any task, regardless of the number of variables involved and the 
status of those variables with respect to their prior beliefs, requires an explicit awareness of the 
principles of experimental design that is, we presume, the exclusive purview of formal science.  
Even in everyday life, the actions that support information gain are presumably less obvious 
than in our study where the presentation of variables was carefully controlled.  Further research 
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might investigate whether children can generate informative interventions in more ecologically 
valid contexts.  
Much as science goes beyond simple experiments, so too does exploratory play.  
Exploratory play is a complex phenomenon, presumably subserving a range of functions other 
than generating informative evidence (sensorimotor stimulation, the acquisition of new skills, 
etc.), and affected by a range of factors other than the ambiguity of evidence (the child’s 
interests, temperament, energy level, upbringing, etc.).  However, to the extent that children 
acquire causal knowledge through exploration, the current results begin to bridge the gap 
between scientific inquiry and child’s play. 
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